



# ***Hardware Security Modules and Kerberos***

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Advantages of integrating HSMs into the Kerberos infrastructure

# WHY HSMS?



## Why HSMs?

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- Compromise containment
- Reliable Auditing
- Performance
- Compliance (FIPS 140)

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Changes to key management when integrating an HSM

# **KEY MANAGEMENT WITH AN HSM**



# For example...

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# nCipher nShield

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# **NCIPHER SECURITY WORLDS**



# Properties of a Security World

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- Key management
  - Managed key usage
- Key encapsulation
  - Keys generated and live inside the security world and (ideally) never leave
- Secure code execution
  - Secure Execution Environment (SEE)



# A Security World Consists of ...

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- Hardware modules
- Administrator card set
- Operator card sets and/or softcards
- Encrypted key data or certificate data

# The Security World Key

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- Contained in ...
  - The administrator card set
- Protects ...
  - Key recovery information

# Module Key

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- Contained in ...
  - The hardware module
- Protects ...
  - Application keys

# Operator Keys

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- Contained in ...
  - Operator card sets
- Protects ...
  - Application keys

# Application Keys

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- Contained in ...
  - Key blobs
- Protects ...
  - Other applications keys
  - Data

# A Security World Consists of ...

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- Keys that protect other keys

# ^ Hierarchy of Keys



Operator Card Set



Operator Key A



Application Key A



Application Key B




secureendpoints



Data

# A Hierarchy of Keys

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# Privilege Separation

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
- Ability to use a key gives the ability to use child keys
- But not vice-versa
- Facilitates privilege separation

# Key Tickets

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- Can be issued for any loaded key
- Can be redeemed for the use of a specific key
  - Necessary for delegating use of keys across application boundaries
- Transient
  - Per session

# Working With Key Tickets



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Integrating HSMs with Kerberos infrastructure

**HEIMDAL**



# Key Usage Model in Heimdal

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- Application has access to plaintext key

# New Key Usage Model

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- Separate key usage from key material
  - An application doesn't need the plaintext key in order to use it
- Ability to specify a key without knowing the plaintext key
  - Key tickets
  - Key blobs
  - Key identifiers
- Ability to load and unload keys
  - Using already loaded keys

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What's involved in integrating the use of HSMs into code

# **KERBEROS API AND LIBRARY**



# Key Encoding

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- Current ...
  - Assumes knowledge of the physical key
    - Key length is fixed
    - No need to prepare/clean up keys. Stateless. (exceptions: derived keys, key schedules)
- Need ...
  - Backwards compatibility
  - Support key references
    - Key tokens
    - Key blobs
    - Key identifiers



# Key Blob

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- Contains (encrypted with parent key)
  - Key
  - Access control list
  - Usage constraints
    - Time limits
    - Use limits
  - Issuance certificate
    - Security world and module information
  - Timestamps

# Key Types and Encryption Types

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- A new “Key Type”?
- A new “Encryption Type”?
- Must distinguish between a plaintext key and a key reference

# Something like ...

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Plain text (fixed)

Header Key blob (variable)

Header Key reference (variable)

## Key “Lifetimes”

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- Loading a key requires a parent/authorization key to be already loaded
- “Lifetime” refers to the time between loading and unloading a key

# Connection to Hardware Devices

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- Connections must be established first
  - Can be somewhat expensive
  - Lazy connections
- Connections should be avoided if unnecessary
  - Specially for client libraries where we may or may not have access to the security world and access to security world is not necessary

# Privilege Separated Processes

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- Break into privilege separated processes
- Move privileged code into SEE

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**Q&S**

