



# Kerberos and PKI Cooperation

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AFS & Kerberos Best Practices Workshop 2006



# METACentre Project

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- Czech nation-wide Grid activity
- Infrastructure for distributed and high performance computing
- Major computing centres in the country
- Security architecture based on Kerberos
  - (Co)-Authored a few Kerberos solutions (SSH, Web authN)
- Partner of international Grid projects (EGEE2)



# PKI Overview

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- Asymmetric cryptography
- Each user has a key-pair consisting of a public and private key
- Private key kept secret, public key spread among other users
- Digital signatures
  - Private key used to generate digital signatures
  - Public key used to verify the signature
- Similarly encryption



# PKI - CAs

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- How to get a correct public key?
- Independent identity providers – Certification authorities
- Digital certificates (X.509)
  - Public key, key owner identity, validity, other auxiliary information
  - signed by the CA key
- Only the CA key is distributed across the community
- Certificate revocation
- Building a trusted CA is a political and organizational problem not a technical issue



# Kerberos vs. PKI

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- Symmetric vs. asymmetric cryptography
  - Performance
- Tickets vs. Certificates
  - Similar concept
  - Issued by identity providers
- Online KDC vs. offline CA
  - Think of revocations (OCSP)
- Password vs. Private key
  - Long-term private keys must be stored on disk, are maintained by the user
  - In real-world deployment many weakness in key management
- Revocation mechanism
  - Not needed for Kerberos, can be source of troubles for PKI
- Scalability
  - KDC must register every user
- Long-term digital signatures
  - Email signing, encrypting is very common using PKI
  - Message level security



# Kerberos and PKI

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- Combining PKI and Kerberos
  - PKI is requested by large Grid projects
  - We have never wanted to abandon Kerberos
- Credential conversions
  - PKI to Kerberos
  - Kerberos to PKI



# PK-INIT

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- IETF specification (draft)
- Adding public key based authentication to the AS\_REQ/AS\_REP messages
  - Using pre-authentication mechanism
- PK-INIT only affects the initial authN step
  - rest of the protocol is untouched (and transparent for the end services).



# PK-INIT Protocol

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- Client sends a public key (certificate) and signature
- KDC verifies the certificate (public key) and signature and check the request
  - Public key must be bound to the client principal
- The KDC reply isn't encrypted with a principal key from the DB but with a new symmetric key
  - The symmetric key is encrypted using the public key (or DH)
- The client verifies the reply, gets the key, decrypts the reply
- From this moment on the client proceeds as usual
  - TGT can be used to ask other tickets





# PK-INIT Implementation

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- We implemented a first version the PK-INIT specs for Heimdal
- Accepted by Heimdal
- In production use in METACentre
  - Support for Grid proxy certificates
  - Integration with the user management system



# PK-INIT and Smart Cards


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- OpenSSL Engine
  - Allows to use devices through #PKCS11
- OpenSC framework
- iKey3000 USB token
  - Combination of smart card and reader
  - Currently distributing among users
- Works both on Unix and Windows



# Smart Card Access

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# Travelkits

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- Unix
  - Standard krb5 tools from the distribution
  - PK-INIT enabled kinit command and auxiliary files (CA certificates) - rpm, deb
- MS Windows
  - Standard Kerberos for Windows
  - PK-INIT enabled kinit command etc.
    - Part of Heimdal ported to Windows
  - Kerberos enabled Putty and WinSCP clients



# Kerberos to PKI

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- Given a Kerberos ticket create a certificate and private key
- Easy access to the Grid, or other PKI based services (www)
- CA
  - Creating certificates for Kerberos tickets
  - Operating online
  - Short-time certificates
    - Private key can be unencrypted



# Kerberos CA

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- kCA
  - Used in the Grid community (Fermilab)
  - kx509, kpkcs11
- MyProxy
  - Very common service in Grid world
  - On-line credential repository
  - Latest versions support also CA mode

The logo consists of a vertical black line on the left, a horizontal black line below it, and three overlapping squares: a yellow one at the top left, a red one at the bottom left, and a blue one at the bottom right. The text 'MyProxy' is in a blue serif font to the right of the graphic.

# MyProxy

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1. Client generates a new key-pair
2. Sends a CSR to the MyProxy server
  - Connection secured by Kerberos
3. MyProxy server returns a signed certificate
  - Using LDAP to map Kerberos principal to subject name
  - Lifetime is copied from the ticket
4. Client stores credential on disk
  - Generated private key and received certificate



# PKI to Kerberos

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- Credentials are stored in „Grid“ format
  - Can be used by standard grid commands
- Other applications must be configured
  - kpkcs11 library for PKCS11 aware apps
  - Using the Windows certificate repository
- Conversions can be run transparently
  - Login script on UI machines





# Conclusions

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- PKI and Kerberos can cooperate
- Multi-mechanism SSO possible